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Use of the deficit model in a shared culture of argumentation: 
The case of foot and mouth science

Nick Wright and, Brigitte Nerlich et al.[Pidgeon, Poortinga]





This article is an empirical contribution to recent debates over the “public understanding of science” (PUS).”[you have to see whether they want single or double quotation marks for highlighting other than quoting] It shows that, at least in this case study, the deficit model and its corresponding others are not reified dualisms but rather operate at a rhetorical and argumentative level in various discourses in science, the social sciences and, indeed, in lay discourses about science. Evidence for a rhetorical use of the deficit model emerged from the analysis of a debate about science and society that took place during the 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD) crisis. As such, the interpretation presented here is geographically and historically specific. Further empirical research is needed to establish the extent to which this analysis may be generally applicable.

	A focus of concern within the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) has been to improve the concepts used to think about how the public understands science. The hypothesis that a lack of knowledge accounts for public hostility towards scientific developments, such as genetically modified food and government handling of Foot and Mouth, has been questioned in recent years (E.g., Irwin  and & Wynne, 1996 some more is there something on fMD). Criticisms of conceiving and offering explanation of public behaviour solely in terms of a deficit in scientific understanding (known as the deficit model) is neatly summarised by The Royal Society Science in Society Report (2004).

The public understanding of science (PUS) approach has been questioned as a deficit model of understanding. The implied relationship that support for science can be achieved through better communication overlooks the fact that different groups may frame scientific issues differently. The approach did not adequately conceptualise how publics' views and attitudes towards science were embedded within wider social, political and institutional understandings, and risks discounting the role of local knowledge and different public values in science debates (see Irwin 1995; Irwin and Wynne 1996).
(The Royal Society 2004 p. 11)

The effort to better account forRecent efforts to take contextual factors (social, political and institutional factors) into account in the PUS (see xxx) raises the spectrahope that the public understanding and relation to science has led some to worry that the deficit model willmight now be abandoned (Sturgis and Allum 2004), consigned, to borrow a term from Trotsky, to “the dustbin of history.” Indeed it is tempting to discuss the use of the deficit model as an archaic approach, in an effort to convey the march of progress in PUS research. However the wholesale rejection of the deficit model in favour of “alternate” explanations of PUS which draw only on the social-cultural relations of the public would be to engage in a simplistic or overextended dualistic thinking which has plagued other subjects (Sayer 1989; Sayer 1991).
Scientific knowledge has been demonstrated to have a slightly positiven effect on attitudes towards science (see for example Sturgis and Allum, 2000; 2001). This work, however, is of itself not insufficient to explain attitudes to scientific problems in their entirety, let alone the complexity of socio-political relations between people and science. . But rRather than dogmatically rejecting the deficit model, outright and dogmatically abandoning notions of the importance of differing levels of scientific knowledge on the PUS,  analysts research is required which better   accounts for connections and complementarities between the deficit model and with contextual factors. The complexity of such a task demands that methods deployed are chosen according to which particular dimensions of the relations involved are of interest.  using different methodologies.
Sturgis and Allum (2004) argue that The tendency to conflate theory and method has is constraining progress (Sturgis and Allum, 2004). hindered the development of such approaches. Those interested in the social-cultural relations through which individual members of the public interact with science, have almost exclusively taken a qualitative approach. Surveys they claim,  are dismissed out of hand on the basis that questionnaires inevitably  decontextualise attitudes towards science. However such dualistic framing of methodologies belies the false nature of the divide between the deficit model or a concern for contextual factors, based as it is on parallel dualisms of quantitative versus qualitative and or surveys versus interviews (for erudite explanations of the “nonsense, fads and fashions” of” of quantitative versus qualitative research see  e.g., Dingwall 1997 and Silverman 2000). (see Dingwall XX). 
SSK has an important role in proffering alternatives to dualistic explanations. Sturgis and & Allum (2004) analyse the interaction of both deficit and contextual factors in a survey-based quantitative analysis. They conclude that scientific knowledge has an effect on attitudes towards science but “not in a straightforward linear main effect” [(#159@p. 6)] due to the influence of contextual factors. They persuasively argue that a more “complex and complete” more open and fruitful  account of the public understanding of science is possible from approaches which integrate both contextualist and deficit perspectives. While they seek to integrate both approaches in the one study by seeking adequate proxies for the purposes of regression modelling, our study seeks to respect the importance of knowledge as a determinant of attitude toward science, but never-the-less focuses on specific contextualising factors. 
Our interest is in the role of language. Analytic claims rest on identifying the function of discourse in the context of the local discussion in which it is embedded.​[1]​ work across supposed dualistic divides.  
Wynne (1998) argues that “A key element of SSK is that it involves identifying (and problematizing the role in knowledge-establishment of) …assumptions, of the kind which have become routinized and taken-for-granted in the prevailing cultural fabric, and which may have shaped ‘natural knowledge’.” (p. 339) As Michael (1996) demonstrates, discourse analysis as a tool can assist in such a task. He identifies discourses of ignorance by which people position themselves and their knowledge (or  rather a lack thereof) in relation to knowledge held by institutions and groups, both expert and lay, about the science of radioactivity. Analysis of  semi-structured interviews and focus groups conducted with members of the public revealed that ignorance was “packaged” in four different ways. Constructed as a deliberate choice, scientific knowledge was presented as obscuring the real issues, and therefore having been jettisoned. Absence of knowledge was also put down to a division of labour: as I am not a scientist – I am not required to know and/or  I don’t need to know. Mental constitution, namely a non-scientific mind was evoked in a number of cases to account for ignorance. The final discourse indentified was “recognised unconstructed absence” - ignorance is linked to the opportunity to rectify - manifest in the interview situation as a “‘don’t know’...followed by a request for the correct answer” (p. 115). As Michael acknowledges (see note 28, p.125) all the discourses are abstractions in the tradition of the ideal type, that is “partial” fabrications for heurisitc purposes.  Those working within SSK may recognise the limitations of explaining and reducing the public understanding of science solely in terms of a deficit in scientific knowledge, but it does not follow that others have.
This paper contributes to understanding how “the public” discusses and conceptualises science in the same vein. An ideal type of in this case, a discourse encompassing the notion of the deficit model, is used to interogate the data. 
begins to explore whether the deficit model is part of wider cultural conceptualisation of the PUS. The starting point of our research, reflecting our interest in “everyday” language (Nerlich, Hamilton and Rowe 2002; Wright 2004) (Nerlich and Döring, in press), was to explore in detail instances of when the deficit model is used in talk. Recently Cook and Evans (2002) analysed interviews with scientists at the University of Reading in a study of how scientists present GM crop research to non-specialists. They found that natural scientists "...view the genre shifts entailed in communicating their work to non-specialists as a problems of simplification only.” (p. [#112@5)] [ #112@13] In other words they found that scientists used the deficit model in constructing a lay sociology of scientific knowledge: , “where scientists have a responsibility to communicate simple scientific messages to the non-experts.” The study is limited in so far as the analysis is confined to the discourse of scientists. The basis for distinguishing between scientist and the public is not explored but rather assumed, scientists are found working within universities. However, as others have pointed out, 
  However sustaining a generalised difference between scientists and a lay public is problematic. Ooutside a particular field of expertise, scientists are also members of the lay public with regard to other specialisms (Lévy-LeBlond 1992). Even the boundaries of the institutions of science are prove to be indistinct on close examination (Evans 2005; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). One way to deal with such a “problem” is to conceived the location of the boundary between expert and lay public as a matter for empirical investigation problems is to conceive of such dualisms as an empirical proposition (see Collins and Evans 2002, and also )]. However, oOur research focuses on , after Locke (1999), is how the public discusses and critiques the forms and nuances expertise takes. Thus: “What matters with respect to the public understanding of science is not some purported division between technical and public knowledge but the activity of argumentative reasoning, the witcraft, actually employed in context of public debate about science...” (Locke 2002: 102 emphasise added) not the nature of expertise as such, but “the nature of the critique of expertise, the forms and nuances it take.” [#139@79] Of empirical interest to us is whether the construction and use of the deficit model in a “lay” sociology of scientific knowledge by those identified as scientists is actually any different to the use of the deficit model by non-scientists. Whether both groups use the deficit model to help make sense of the world, is therefore a matter for research rather then presupposition. As Locke (2002) says:
What matters with respect to the public understanding of science is not some purported division between technical and public knowledge but the activity of argumentative reasoning, the witcraft, actually employed in context of public debate about science...
[#137@102]
Use of the deficit model in structuring media stories strongly suggests that there is, to some extent, to borrow a phrase coined by Locke (1999 p. : 80), a “shared culture of argumentation”  [ #139@80] between the media, and the public and scientist. Michael (1996) notes that the media is an important conduit for the spread and reinforcement of the idea of the deficit model: “With sub-headlines such as ‘With more than a third of the population not knowing that the earth goes round the sun, Britain could be in serious trouble’ (Sunday Times, 19 November 1989), the narrative of public deficit is conveyed to a wider audience, and the contrast between a knowledgeable science and an ignorant public is reiterated.” (Michael 1996 p. 109) TThis is not to suggest that readers are dupes, blindly accepting what they read, but that they recognise and are drawn to the way stories are constructed. Newspapers are, after all, commercial enterprises reliant on attracting custom and therefore stories must resonate with their readership. While the idea that the media or science communication stories directly affects what the public thinks or does in a simple, deterministic way (equivalent to a journalistic deficit model), it appears reasonable to that there are maybe elements of a shared argumentative practice between the media, the public and scientists is strongly suggested from comparison of studies conducted on those groups respectively (for example see Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Michael 1996; Petts et al., 2001). From Oour analysis we are able to research shows suggests propose that the deficit model itself is one common element. a shared culture of argumentation exisits orientated around versions of the deficit model.
	




2. Foot and mouth as a case study

In 2001 Great Britain suffered an outbreak of FMD of unexpected magnitude. The first case was confirmed in pigs in an abattoir in Essex on 20 February 2001.​[2]​ The possible source of the infection was traced to a small pig unit in Northumberland, Burnside Farm, where it is thought that the disease was introduced at the beginning of February through the use of waste meat products mixed into pigswill. From then onwards the disease spread quickly throughout the UK. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) (now Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA) made efforts to trace the spread of the disease and eliminate it, applying the traditional methods of slaughter and livestock movement restrictions (see Woods 2004). The epidemic peaked in early April after two months of rapid spread throughout Great Britain, but especially in the north (Cumbria, Dumfries and Galloway, and Northumberland), the southwest (Devon and Somerset) and Welsh borders (Hertfordshire, Worcestershire and Powys). By the end of September the epidemic had abated and in January 2002 the UK again regained disease free status. Millions of animals were slaughtered to eradicate FMD from Great Britain.
The focus group on which our analysis is based, took place in June 2001, in Bude, Cornwall, just after a case of FMD had been confirmed in the area. Although by the end of the epidemic Cornwall had only 4 infected premises​[3]​, just over 10,000 animals were slaughtered (DEFRA 2003b), while Bude found itself only 20 miles from a major outbreak in North Devon, a county which was hit hard, suffering 173 infected premises and just under 400,000 animals slaughtered (DEFRA 2003a; DEFRA 2003b). Bude is a coastal town of 7,000 inhabitants (?) with an economy largely dependent on farming and tourism, the two industries most severely affected by the outbreak.
	The focus group was conducted with 6 people (half male, half female) holding non-agriculture occupations (see Table 1 for a full summary of descriptive details). Three of the groupparticipants had connections with farming and/or the tourism industry, 2 were self employed, 1 worked full-time, the other part-time and the other for which data is available was retired. The youngest was in the age category 18-20, the oldest 65+. Qualifications within the group ranged from HNC/HND level to no formal awards held. The respondents were selected from a group of 78 individuals who on completion of a questionnaire , administered by the University of East Anglia, investigating FMD, food production and food safety (see\Poortinga et al.), indicated they would be willing to take part in a discussion group (see Poortinga et al., 2004). The session, lasting just over 90 minutes, was recorded and transcribed. 
The sample size is small and non-representative in statistical terms. However: 

Because one is interested in language use rather than the people generating the language and because a large number of linguistic patterns are likely to emerge from a few people, small samples or a few interviews are generally quite adequate for investigating an interesting and practically important range of phenomena. For discourse analysts the success of a study is not in the least dependent on sample size. It is not the case that a larger sample necessarily indicates a more painstaking or worthwhile piece of research. Indeed, more interviews can often simply add to the labour involved without adding anything to the analysis...the value or generalizability of results depends on the reader assessing the importance and interest of the effect described and deciding whether it has vital consequences for the area of social life in which it emerges and possibly for other diverse areas.
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 161)


Interviews are conceived of “as a piece of social interaction in their own right” (Potter and Wetherell: 9), explanatory propositions made in relation to discourse use are, to paraphrase Giddens (1984), of a generalising type (for examples of this approach see Wetherell and Potter, 1992;Wright, 2004). In this way claims are extrapolated beyond the original context from which they were developed, to inferr something of the nature of the public understanding of science in general. As far as possible, claims are verified by referring to the literature to test whether inferences, in this case that there is a shared culture of argumentation orientated around the deficit model holds in other contexts. 

Name (need to equate with F1 etc – does Wouter still have this info? )	SexGender	Connection with tourism/farming	Age category	Employment status	Main occupation(based on Standard Occupational Classification 2000)	Highest level of qualification
Graham (M1)Graham (M1)	Male	No	46-54	Full-time	Lorry driver Plant and machine operative	HNC/HND
Nathan (M2)Nathan (M2)	Male	Yes	18-20	Part-time	Door steward Sales and customer service	Other
Rex (M3)Rex (M3)	Male	No	65+	Retired	Retired	HNC/HND
Janice (F1)Janice (F1)	Female	Yes	36-45	Self-employed	Furniture and antiques Sales and customer service 	None
Kath (F2)Kath (F2)	Female	Un-known (Uk)	Uk	Uk	Uk	Uk
Judith (F3)Judith (F3)	Female	Yes	46-54	Self-employed	Business proprietorProfessional	None

Table 1. Details of focus group participants in Bude, Cornwall.

3. The deficit model

Discussion of FMD in the focus group initially began, after prompting from the moderator, with each participant introducing themselves and articulating an issue of concern regarding food production in Britain today. FMD was framed within the topics of EU subsidies, factory farming, cheap food and agricultural imports (for detailed discussion see Nerlich 2004). In raising these issues, each member staked a claim to know something of relevance about FMD. The deficit model - explaning the public understanding of science in terms of a deficiency of knowledge - was employed at various points in the focus group discussion by the participants to relate themselves to science. Versions of the deficit model differed in terms of the relations implied between science and society. Increasing public understanding from better communication by scientists (x-ref the quote form The Royal Society Science in Society 2004 report cited at the begining of this paper) was one of four versions in use. 

In the course of the focus group discussion the relation between knowledge and ignorance was considered.In the first discourse we consider, public ignorance of scientific knowledge is considered problematic for it leaves people open to manipualtion from press and the government.  
M2
You can tell people anything and they will believe it, but if the government put out a press release telling us that it is some gerbils that is spreading it everyone would believe it because it was the press or the government telling us
F1
I think it’s the press rather than the government. I think they’d probably not believe it if it’s the government
M2
People are stupid. I think masses of people just are…

M1 
They’re not stupid, they’re just gullible

M2
Well it’s the same thing

Recall of consipricay theories in circualtion is proffered as proof that people are being duped because of a lack of scientific knowledge: “I’ve heard several rumours including Saddam Hussein … I think what’s really surprises me is the fact that people don’t seem to have any clue about the actual nature of the spread of virile infection. And so consequently because they don’t understand any of this they can believe all of these rumours…people don’t seem to understand the nature of scientific inquiry” (F1). Simple causes and effect is asserted between ignorance of science and action (belief in conspiracy theories). In this way a deficiency of scientific knowledge in others is construted as negative. However ignorance of 

The focus group participants consider how the related topics of how the virus is spead and stopped. There unanswered 
 
ignorance, Implicitin the discussion that others 

 not a stable attitude but discursive resource. 
 Exchanges around this topic began with somewhat bemused but open talk between M1 and M2 over the effectiveness of measures taken to halt the spread of FMD (see first three lines below).

  F1 was prompted to assert that people are ignorant of science and therefore liable to be duped by “conspiracy theories” as to how the virus was spread.

M1
They reckon it could travel up to five hundred miles, they said at one point, in the air.

M2
Well what’s the point of…

M1
…a road is a big enough break between farms? (laughter)​[4]​ 

M2
Well that’s what I was just going to say, what’s the whole disinfectant thing and all of that then if it can travel five hundred miles?

	F1
It’s nonsense. Well I think the whole point of this thing is that, I find these conspiracy theories a bit bizarre I must say. I’ve heard several rumours including Saddam Hussein, that’s one of the most bizarre, I think but I think in either direction it depends on the political point of view of the person who’s spreading the rumour or discussing the rumour… I think what’s really surprises me is the fact that people don’t seem to have any clue about the actual nature of the spread of virile infection. And so consequently because they don’t understand any of this they can believe all of these rumours…people don’t seem to understand the nature of scientific inquiry.

Others in the group agree that there is a general ignorance of science, concluding that “people are quite stupid.” As F1 asserts that ignorance of science leaves people open to manipulation, so “stupid[ity]” is concluded to mean that people are “gullible.” 

M2
Well what you are talking about is the fact that a person is quite intelligent, people are quite stupid.

M1
No I’m not saying that

M2
You can tell people anything and they will believe it, but if the government put out a press release telling us that it is some gerbils that is spreading it everyone would believe it because it was the press or the government telling us

F1
I think it’s the press rather than the government. I think they’d probably not believe it if it’s the government

M2
People are stupid. I think masses of people just are…

M1 
They’re not stupid, they’re just gullible

M2
Well it’s the same thing

F3
Well I don’t want to say this in a pejorative sense but I think they’re ignorant, I don’t mean that in a nasty sense I mean they don’t know they literally don’t know. They don’t know enough about the science behind it to be able to be able to make an assessment, so the media tends to make that assessment for them.

The passages illustrate what it is useful to think of as a popular use of the “deficit model.” The basic tenets of this as a lay sociological explanation are: people are ignorant of science and require educating; and: ignorance is problematic, for it leaves people open to believe conspiracy theories or to manipulation by the press. 
	However, as soon as it is posited, this argumentative or rhetorical use of the deficit model draws defensive reactions. Protestations assert that “…we don’t need to know…All they need to do is be informed” (M1). A distinction is drawn up between us and the “ignorant masses” (see italicised pronouns). Subsequently, a powerful analogy is deployed as an eloquent defence/justification of scientific ignorance. It is important to remember at this point, that this reaction is the result of a self-posited sociological explanation; the deficit model was a group construction and therefore the following exchange should not be characterised as a split between scientists and non-scientists. The constructed categories and analogy act as a shield used to defend participants against being tarred with negative attributes through self-association with the deficit model.

F3
…They don’t know enough about the science behind it to be able to be able to make an assessment, so the media tends to make that assessment for them.

M1
Regardless of this, we don’t need to know the science behind this foot and mouth outbreak. All they need to do is be informed 

M2
That’s right […] Like paramedics why do they give first aid it is because they are paramedics. I don’t go up and try and help them, I don’t go and tell scientists what to do they’re scientists, they’re meant to tell us the answers to things.

The speaker M2 asserts that knowing about FMD is not necessary, as that is the job of scientists. Ignorance is put down to a division of labour​[5]​. To this end a very effective medical example is invoked. The esteem in which medical expertise in our culture is held is well-documented (xx). What is more, at the sight of an accident, space for paramedics to work is expected and often enforced by attendant police. This scene forms a very powerful metaphor to which M2 appeals for justification of his ignorance. As a rhetorical strategy it does more than just explain, it insists on ignorance – I am not required to know, I don’t need to know, so therefore I shouldn’t interfere. Attendant negative connotations of ignorance detectable in the preceding construction and use of the deficit model are countered in this instance by emphasising the positive virtues and role of the expert within society.




So what you are basically saying is that one person says one thing about Foot and Mouth, and someone says a completely conflicting thing.  Once says vaccinate and the other says cull, what do you do?

M3
Don’t believe either of them.

M1
Someone has got to come up with the decision and say right this is what we are going to do.

F1
Yes but as soon as you make that decision and you say right we are going to vaccinate, and somebody else comes up and says oh no no no you mustn’t vaccinate…because they benefit.

F3






And I know you can put the blame on the media but I mean… between MAFF and the media they should be able to get the message through to the majority of the country that is basically what I try to say.

The deficit model is in effect turned back on itself by shifting the location of agency. No longer is it the fault of the “ignorant masses” that they “don’t know,” but it is the fault of the scientists that they “don’t agree with each other” - this is F3’s preferred explanation as self-appointed defender of science within the focus group - the government and the media are at fault for not communicating. And so the deficit model becomes complicit in the descent into a blame game. 
	Finally, the discussion comes back to the advantage of filling in gaps in the “deficits” of information, and to the virtues of conveying, if possible, reliable, truthful and consistent information.

M


















Well there should be a government department to do with making an announcement it shouldn’t be that hard.  So if MAFF want to tell the whole of the country something they only have to put it in like all the newspapers, and I am sure they can go up to the newspapers and go we are a government department and we want a small section telling everyone a little bit of information.

Here a hierarchical deficit model based on a division of labour in a “knowledge society” is implicitly acknowledged and can be summarised as follows: “we on the ground don’t know everything, can’t know everything, and don’t have to know everything; however, “up there” there should be somebody who knows and can provide information to the government, who in turns provides information to the media, who in turn provides it to us on the ground; and we all know that whatever that information is, we have to look at it sceptically, as it will certainly not always be ‘the truth’.” Both the deficit model and the communication of truth model are reflexively recognised as models which, both, have their uses and their limitations.
	Analysis of the focus group data has shown that non-specialists use a particular version of the deficit model to construct their view of the relationship between scientists and the public. They argue that “scientists should engage in better communication with the public.” This use of the deficit model shares attributes with the deficit model used by scientists and policy when they argue for a “better public understanding of science.” A call for more education invariably implies the public is at fault for not having learnt enough, while pleas for better communication suggests scientists are responsible for not imparting enough knowledge. Users of one or the other “deficit model” will commonly locate themselves in the opposite camp to the one they identify to be at fault. We argue that scientists and the public share a culture of argumentation in which both “sides” use a version of the deficit model that highlights mismatches between knowledge and communication, depending on where users locate themselves in any particular instance within science or society. Although in the discussion references were made and blame apportioned to a complete lack of knowledge as opposed to faulty communication, conclusions never completely solidified around such polarised positions. Instead reflexivity and indeterminacy characterised exchanges.  

4. Reflexivity & indeterminacy

Exploration of the range of resources people have for disputing factual claims, or the ways they have for “at least proposing possible grounds for scepticism and critique...” (Locke, 1999 p. )83 enables us to refine and explore some of the complexity in the public understanding of science.

Discussion of FMD in the focus group initially began, after prompting from the moderator, with each participant introducing themselves and articulating an issue of concern regarding food production in Britain today. FMD was framed within the topics of EU subsidies, factory farming, cheap food and agricultural imports (see Nerlich 2004). In raising these issues, each member staked a claim to know something of relevance about FMD. Ensuing conversation was peppered with reflexive discussion of the limits of participants’ knowledge and critical caveats were attached to what and how people know. 

F3
Well I feel it is ridiculously the amount of food we get from abroad, whereas we are producing probably very good quantity of food and good quality of food, sending it abroad, why should we have to keep buying it from abroad and bringing back into this country. I think that is farcical really, and also this business of foot and mouth I think possibly  there’s a lot of blame lies with the fact that people  are taking a lot of short cuts to actually in the way they look after their animals, and the way that they try to produce food. I think possibly that there is a lot of blame for the way that the foot and mouth is actually come about.

M1
It depends on what rumours you listen though.

F3





…It’s very, very confusing


What is known is hedged as rumour [see \Wright, (In prep.) #185]. “I think” reduces the stake, or in other words the weight that F3 attaches to the statement of blame. A general admission of confusion is made at this point in the discussion with no dissent.  Later on similarly cautious discussion and explicit admissions of ignorance are made in relation to the cause of the outbreak:

M
What do you feel the cause was? Rex M3 suggested it might have come from imported…

M1
Well there was, shortly before the outbreak apparently from the MAFF labs, a sample of foot and mouth disappeared……

M3
Yes I’ve heard that 

M1
... so I have heard, whether that’s right or not one doesn’t know. 

M3





Nobody knows how it started.

M
Is your general impression that there is a lot of confusion and a lot of rumours but nobody really knows?

M2
The propaganda that I heard was that it sort of came over from France I don’t know how or that and err obviously everybody’s going to blame it France regardless of what the actual cause is. 

F2






At this point in the discussion there is reluctance from the participants to be drawn into making definitive statements on the cause and spread of the disease. The participants construct a critical relationship to what they know, categorising the knowledge they hold in terms of “rumour” and “propaganda” and therefore as distrustful.  A sense of frustration and confusion “of not knowing for sure” how the disease is spread is tangible:

M1
Well that’s how it happened in the Isle of Wight a few years ago, it came across from France. 

M3
They said that came from France

M1
They reckon it could travel up to five hundred miles they said at one point in the air.

M2
Well what’s the point of?

M1
A road is a big enough break between farms? (Laughter)

M2
That’s what I was just going to say, what’s the whole disinfectant thing and all of that then if it can travel five hundred miles?

The series of three questions set consecutively by the participants throws open the problem of how FMD is spread and how its spread can be stopped. What is known, that which has already been hedged in terms of propaganda and rumour, is further problematized as questions are asked, rather than answered, about FMD. 




The deficit model, although constructed and deconstructed by academics for academics is, as we have shown, part of a shared framework of argumentation and rhetoric; in short, a shared social construction that framed discussion of FMD. As a formidably seductive structuring mechanism, it can be found in both oral and written output. The dualism on which the deficit model rests, when evoked on its own, has limitations in the extent to which it is able to account for the complexities in the public understanding of science (a multi-dimensional problem). However, it would appear unwise to call for it to be completely discarded. “Thinking”, as Sayer (1991) points out is “scarcely possible” without dualisms: “The question is not whether they can be avoided but how they are defined and related” (Sayer 1991 p. 283). Therefore attempts, such as that made by Sturgis and Allum (2004), to challenge the de facto orthodoxy that has connected the deficit model and contextualist perspective with quantitative and qualitative research methods method respectively, is to be welcomed. 
This paper has presented evidence that non-expert inquiries of the science of FMD control were rhetorically framed by the epistemological framework of the deficit model. That is not to say those in the focus group jumped unthinkingly to simplistic conclusions. An assumption Wynne (1996) notes, made all too often of the public: “The predominant perspectives on the risk society and the transformations of modernity... implicitly treat the non-expert world as epistemically vacuous. It may be reflexive, but such reflexivity is implied to have little or no intellectual content in the sense of having cognitive access to nature or society” [Wynne, 1996 #113@61. The nature of society, of how people came to know about FMD was discussed by the focus group. Clear, simple answers on the basis that either the government should just engage in better communication or that the public ought to be better scientifically educated, were by the participants own admissions elusive. This underlines an important role SKK has in offering a more sophisticated analysis of science in society. 
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^1	  Discourse analysis proceeds from interogation of the local context of language use, ultimately however, to some degree the credibility of analytic claims depend on establishing links with broader explanatory theories of society. That the importance of the latter is not always acknowledged, forms a powerful critique of the limits to discourse analysis (Dingwall, 2003, personnal communication).
^2	  The best way to ‘picture’ the spread of the disease can be found on: http://www.guardian.co.uk/footandmouth/flash/0,7365,443772,00.html
^3	  Premises where foot and mouth disease has been confirmed
^4	  Roads were constructed as borders during the crisis, at which attempts were made to stop the virus crossing. Various official and unofficially sanctioned measures were deployed including laying out of disinfectant mats for vehicles to cross and the provision of foot baths at entrances off highways.
^5	  A discourse noted in Mike Michael’s analysis of about radiation (see XX).
